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In 1999 the EC launched its Sustainability Impact Assessment Programme, which had as its goal 
the integration of sustainability concerns into the development of trade policy.  It was to include 
the development of a methodological framework by the University of Manchester (IDPM) for 
assessing the sustainability impact of trade agreements, together with studies to inform the 
‘Doha Round’ negotiations of the WTO. This paper considers the application of the IDPM 
methodology to the SIA being undertaken by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) for the current 
EPA negotiations in the Pacific region of the ACP.  
 
 
Introduction 
In 1999 the EC launched its Sustainability Impact Assessment Programme (SIA), which had as 
its goal the integration of economic, social and environmental considerations into the 
development of its trade policy.  It is an approach that emphasises the long-term inter-
generational impact of policy decisions and the active involvement of stake-holders in the 
decision making process. The SIA programme included the development of a methodological 
framework for assessing the sustainability impact of trade agreements, while the subsequent 
studies were to inform the negotiations and the dialogue with civil society. The first application 
of this new approach was to be the negotiations being undertaken under the ‘Doha Round’ of the 
WTO. As part of this process the Institute for Development Policy Management at the University 
of Manchester (IDPM) was contracted by the Commission to develop a methodology for a 
preliminary SIA for the negotiations. Subsequently PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) have been 
contracted to undertake an SIA of the current Cotonou Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
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negotiations. These are intended to replace, by 2008, the existing non-reciprocal trade 
concessions given by the EU to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing 
countries under the previous Lomé Agreements. 
This paper will draw upon the IDPM methodology and compare it with the approach 
being taken by PWC. It will also attempt to identify those crucial issues that are relevant to the 
Pacific EPA negotiations and their SIA assessment, drawing upon the economic impact 
assessment that has already been prepared by Scollay (2002) for the ACP Secretariat. Finally it 
will provide a critical assessment of PWC’s SIA report.   
 
The EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements 
Trade relations between the EU and developing countries are governed by three major 
agreements, the General System of Preferences, ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) and the Cotonou 
Agreement.  The General System of Preferences (GSP), introduced in 1971, offers non-
reciprocal reductions in MFN tariffs for manufactured goods, ranging from 15% on sensitive 
products to duty free access. A safeguard clause remains allowing for the reintroduction of duties 
should imports threaten serious difficulties for an EU producer and a ‘graduation mechanism’ 
providing for the exclusion of specific country-sector combinations depending upon the 
exporting country’s overall level of industrial development and degree of export specialisation.  
 The EBA agreement is a unilateral non-reciprocal trade concession offering tariff and 
quota free access to the EU market to all low-income developing countries (LDC). Some 
safeguard clauses remain, particularly in regard to rice, sugar and bananas. Since this concession 
is confined to low-income countries it is WTO compatible. 
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 The issue of WTO compatibility (compliance with Article XXIV) was a central issue in 
the renegotiation of the Lomé Conventions, which governed trade and aid relations between the 
EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing countries. Under the new 
Cotonou Agreement the non-reciprocal Lomé trade preferences are to be replaced by WTO 
compatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) for the middle-income ACP countries by 
2008 when the current WTO waiver expires. WTO compatibility will require the reciprocal 
elimination of barriers on substantially all trade. The precise definition of substantially all trade 
is the subject of considerable debate.  The EU appears to be adopting a definition that covers 
80% to 90% of the value of trade. However the threat of reference to the Disputes Panel may be 
an important political influence in its interpretation and, further, Article XXIV may be subject to 
renegotiation during the current WTO trade round. The EPA may cover trade related matters 
including intellectual property rights, standardisation of certification, competition policy, labour 
standards, consumer protection and will include the trade in services. 
 
Regional Trade 
Any discussion of the Pacific EPA (PEPA) must take into account existing regional trade 
agreements. The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) commits ten of the island 
states to progressively establishing a free trade area. It came into force in 2003 and provides for 
the free trade in goods within eight years (ten for the smaller states). Sensitive products will 
remain protected until 2016. Meanwhile the Melanesians Spearhead Group – Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu – were committed to moving to a free trade area 
by 2008, however it failed to realise the expected benefits and by 2000 Vanuatu and the 
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Solomons had effectively suspended their involvement. Currently intra-PACP trade is 
insignificant, at only 2% of total trade.  
Of more significance is the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) 
between the members of the Pacific Forum – the island states and Australia and New Zealand. 
PICTA is seen as a subsidiary agreement under PACER and came into force in 2002. It promises 
broad ranging trade negotiations on trade liberalisation in 2011 and provides an Australia and 
New Zealand funded trade facilitation programme. Although it does not contain any formal MFN 
obligations, the negotiation of a reciprocal free trade agreement by the PACPs with the EU 
would trigger similar negotiations with Australia and New Zealand under PACER. As PACER 
was seen as an attempt by these two countries to avoid the EU obtaining a trade advantages, 
especially in regard to services and investor protection, the most likely outcome of such 
negotiations is for the PACPs to offer similar terms to Australia and New Zealand as those that 
would be extended to the EU. The economic implications of such a reciprocal trade agreement 
are far more significant than the likely impact of concluding an EPA with the EU. Similarly the 
three Pacific US ‘compact’ ACP states – The Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, 
Palau – are likely to have to provide similar duty-free access for the US. Finally it should be 
noted that the five low income PACPs – Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu - 
will qualify for non-reciprocal duty free access under the EBA. 
 The EU is currently a minor source for PACP imports, providing 4% of the total (€ 210 
m.: 2003). By contrast Australia (39%), Singapore (15%) and New Zealand (11%) dominate 
imports for all of the PACP countries except the US ‘compact’ countries. Similarly PACP 
exports are principally to Australia (23%) and Japan (11%). The EU is the third largest export 
market, taking 9% of the world total, worth € 530 m. in 2003. However these EU exports are 
 5
dominated by three PACP states – PNG (67% of the PACP total : 2003), Fiji (20%) and the 
Marshall Islands (11%). In the case of the Marshall Islands exports to the EU are of cruise ships 
and yachts (89% of the total value of exports), for PNG palm oil (42%) and Fiji sugar (92%). 
Thus for Fiji the EU’s Sugar Protocol is of particular significance.  It currently offers a 
guaranteed market of 165,348 tonnes at the EU’s high internal prices. In addition there is an 
Agreement on Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) until 2006, which provides for additional imports 
of cane sugar from the ACPs and India when a shortfall is predicted in supplies to the EU’s cane 
sugar refineries. The price applicable to SPS sugar is 85% of the guaranteed minimum EU price 
under the Sugar Protocol. Fiji is currently allocated 30,000 tonnes (9.3%) of the SPS allocation. 
Under the EBA duty free access for sugar will be phased in between 2006 and 2009 with these 
quotas counted against SPS allocations. 
 
Sustainability Impact Assessments 
In 1999 the EC decided to undertake an SIA to inform their participation in the Doha Round of 
trade negotiations of the WTO. The IDPM was contracted to develop a methodology for the 
various phases of the SIA (see Kirkpatrick, Lee and Morrisey, 1999; Kirkpatrick and Lee, 1999 
& 2002). Although an SIA’s detailed requirements vary with each stage of the assessment 
process and between individual cases, they share common principles. It is these principles, 
outlined in the IDPM’s Phase Three report (2002), that are considered within the context of the 
Pacific EPA negotiations. 
 The IDPM identified four stages when undertaking a full SIA assessment - screening and 
scooping; assessment of proposed measures; assessment of alternative mitigation and 
enhancement measures (M&E) and monitoring and post-evaluation. Here we will consider only 
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the first three stages. They recommended that the scheduling of the SIA process should be 
commenced sufficiently early to enable it to allow consultations – both during screening/scoping 
and upon completion - and for it to be taken into account during the trade negotiations. The 
timing of the PSIA was already a cause for concern, as PWC had yet to publish their preliminary 
studies while regional negotiations had already commenced. Although the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat were consulted in the formulation of the contract for the SIA there was otherwise 
little awareness of this exercise. 
 Screening and scoping are intended to select and systematise the SIA of each trade 
measure. It should identify the specific aspects of each trade measure and the possible 
negotiation outcomes (‘scenarios’) which should be submitted for assessment. It will need to 
select which country groups or individual countries should be assessed, the time horizons over 
which the impact should be evaluated and identify relevant changes in the broader context of 
changes in the international trade environment. Finally it will need to specify the sustainability 
indicators to be used, data sources and the methods to be employed. Scoping is likely to employ 
simplified causal chain analysis (CCA) and include preliminary identification of the M&E that 
might later need to be appraised. 
 
Country Grouping 
It is clear from developments that a common ACP-wide EPA, that is the preservation of the 
existing Lomé structure, is not a feasible option. The first question therefore is whether a 
comprehensive PACP EPA is the only option worthy of assessment. Except for the four 
members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group there is no intention to move towards a customs 
union in the region, while the ‘compact’ countries will have particular sensitivities to an EPA 
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that might affect the relationship to the US. Indeed a divergence of interest is inevitable in view 
of the differing adjustment costs that an EPA would impose and the benefits that might result. 
Countries differ in the importance of the EU as an export market, in the share of imports from 
the EU, Australia, New Zealand and the US, in the vulnerability of local industries to import 
competition and the level and revenue importance of tariffs. For the five low income PACPs an 
EPA will offer no advantages over the duty-free access they are already guaranteed under the 
EBA. 
Only for Fiji (sugar and tuna) and PNG (tuna and palm oil) is the EU an important export 
market.  Even for Fiji the Sugar Protocol, rather than an EPA, is of prime importance. The future 
value of the Sugar Protocol will be dependent upon the EU guaranteed price, which is being 
reduced under the pressures for CAP reform; the EC has proposed that the guaranteed price 
should be reduced by 39%, beginning in July 2006. The EU sugar regime is also under threat 
from external pressures. Recently Brazil, Thailand and Australia won a challenge against the 
EU’s sugar export subsidies in the WTO. Although this differs from the previous banana case, in 
that it is confined to the export subsidies rather than the system of import quotas, it nonetheless 
increases the pressure on the EU to undertake a fundamental reform of its sugar regime. This is 
reflected in the EU-PACP Negotiations Joint Road Map (EC 2004) - “In accordance with Article 
36(4) of the Cotonou Agreement the Pacific ACP and the EC shall review the commodity 
protocols in the context of the new trading arrangements, in particular as regards compatibility 
with WTO rules, and with a view to safeguarding the benefits derived therefrom” (para. 11). The 
abolition of EU sugar export subsidies will be of the benefit to the Fijian industry selling into the 
world market, but any moves to open up the EU market to other countries sugar exports will be 
to its disadvantage. In the context of the EPA negotiations it is unlikely that sugar could be 
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excluded, as such an agreement would fail to meet the ‘substantially all trade’ WTO requirement 
in the case of Fiji and many other ACPs in other regions e.g. Caribbean.1  
An SIA focused upon PNG and Fiji, as the largest economies with a particular 
commodity focus and an export orientation towards the EU, appears to be one obvious choice. 
This meets the ‘trade structure’ and ‘vulnerability to changes in trade’ criteria for SIA selection 
recommended by the IDPM. However for a number of other PACPs the EU offers a potential to 
develop their fish exports, with the trade facilitation provisions, which might be offered under an 
EPA, crucial to the future development of this industry. For other PACPs the inclusion of the 
service industries in any EPA may be a major attraction, given the importance of tourism and 
offshore finance. For all PACPs access to the Investment Facility of Cotonou offers potential 
advantages. Finally, access to the French territories in the Pacific might offer high-income 
markets for some countries. Thus a more general SIA for the whole PACP group would be 
expected. The small size of many of the PACPs and their exposure to environmental risk, as well 
as a high incidence of poverty, might suggest individual SIAs, but this was an unrealistic 
expectation.  
However for all the PACPs an EPA will trigger renegotiation of PACER. It is the 
assessment of the outcome of such a renegotiation that would present the greatest challenge to 
any Pacific SIA.  The obvious scenario is to assume the extension of reciprocal free trade to 
Australia and New Zealand, and unlike an EPA with the EU, this will have significant 
implications for the ability of governments to raise revenues through import tariffs, given their 
dependence upon imports from these countries; Tonga, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu have a 
particularly high share of tariff revenues in total tax income. It would also impose far more 
                                                 
1
 For a further discussion of the EU Sugar regime in regard to Fiji see Levantis (2005) 
 9
significant structural adjustment requirements on some economic sectors, especially 
manufacturing in PNG and Fiji. However such an outcome would minimise the economic 
welfare losses arising from trade diversion. Thus a PACP SIA, perhaps excluding the five low-
income PACP members who benefit from the non-reciprocal EBA, and assuming the extension 
of reciprocal free trade to Australia and New Zealand, appeared a third obvious scenario for 
consideration. 
Other groupings, based upon ACP sugar producers or small island states, are not only 
likely to present insuperable analytical difficulties, but do not reflect the reality of the regional 
negotiating focus that has emerged. This is reflected in the regional approach, approved by the 
EC, that PWC are taking to their SIAs. However the Pacific Islands Forum, which offers policy 
support to the PACP governments, is advocating an initial negotiating position that involves the 
the ‘opt-in’ groupings suggested by Grnyberg and Unguglo (see Scollay page 68) – a master or 
‘umbrella’ PACP wide agreement, with separate subsidiary agreements to which individual 
PACP’s can then subscribe. The master agreement is intended to set out the principles to govern 
the subsidiary agreements, including dispute settlement procedures, but would be designed so as 
not to require notification to the WTO. The subsidiary agreements would cover services, trade 
facilitation, fisheries, mining, forestry and investment promotion as well as the trade in goods. 
Thus some PACPs would be able to avoid a commitment to reciprocal free trade, and triggering 
PACER renegotiations, while still subscribing to the overall EPA. This appears at first glance to 
diverge considerably from the EU’s intentions and might represent an unwelcome precedent if 
granted to the PACPs. The question of the degree of divergence and flexibility in regional EPAs 
will be brought into sharp focus by this proposal. For the SIA this issue would need to be quickly 
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resolved since such a “pick and mix” EPA would present real problems of analytical complexity 
– effectively requiring individual PACP studies. 
 As well as having to make an assumption about the extension of an EPA to Australia and 
New Zealand under PACER, an SIA will have to make assumptions about the WTO framework. 
A principal concern for the EU, in the light of the Banana Protocol dispute, is that EPAs should 
be WTO compatibility. With the ongoing negotiations for the Doha Round of the WTO the 
question of what ‘compatibility’ will mean is by no means clear. The central issue remains the 
requirement for reciprocity in any trade agreement covering middle-income developing countries 
and the inclusion of ‘substantially all trade’. Changes in the already ambiguous de minimis limits 
would allow the exemption of some products that might minimise the adverse impact of a free 
trade agreement (FTA). At this stage it is probably only feasible to adopt a cautious approach to 
the prospect of radical change in Article XXIV and assume the 80-90% trade coverage 
requirement being adopted by the EU. 
In regard to Fiji, specific assumptions will also need to be made about the future of the 
Sugar Protocol. With the EU market opening to LDCs under the EBA there is some doubt as to 
whether the SPS will be renewed after 2006. The EU has already agreed a 36% reduction in the 
internal guaranteed price over a four years period. Although the EU is offering € 40 m. of 
additional assistance to the ACP sugar producers for structural adjustment further aid will 
depend upon the outcome of the negotiations on the EU’s next Financial Perspective2. The most 
realistic assumption would probably be of one of unlimited quantitative access to the EU market, 
but at reduced prices. 
 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed discussion of the Sugar Protocol see Scollay Part IV (2002) 
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Areas for Negotiation 
Any SIA will need to identify the significant components of the trade negotiations for analysis. 
For the trade in goods six aspects suggest themselves – products for exemption, imposition of 
labour standards (e.g. in the Fijian garment industry), product standards, environmental standards 
(e.g. ‘dolphin friendly tuna fishing’, sustainability), rules of origin and the time horizon for 
implementation of an EPA. Although the general interpretation of WTO requirements is that the 
implementation of a FTA should be completed over a time period that does not exceed ten years 
and the EU subscribes to this expectation - with all EPA’s commencing in 2008 with a ten-year 
transition period - there have been exceptions (e.g. EU- South Africa agreement). The question 
of the phasing of any tariff reductions will also be a subject of negotiations. However an SIA 
need not confine its assessment to the implementation period, indeed the most significant 
environmental and social impacts are unlikely to be felt in such a short time horizon.  
 Any attempt by the EU to impose environmental and labour standards upon its trading 
partners would be of significance for an SIA that is intended to take account of the broader social 
and environmental impacts of any policy. But such policies may be developing separately from 
the EPA negotiations, instead being of a ‘global’ nature within a WTO context, affecting all of 
the EU’s trading partners. PWC needed to consider the prospect of their inclusion in the EPA 
negotiations and, if not, likely developments in the broader international trading agenda of the 
EU. Similarly ‘rules of origin’ were identified as one of the outstanding issues that would need to 
be resolved in the EPAs during the Cotonou discussions. It is not clear whether this will be 
resolved at the ACP or regional level.  This is an aspect that may require a specific sector 
analysis to be drawn upon in the overall SIA.  
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 In regard to the trade in services the PACPs are looking for a liberalisation in EU market 
access in those sectors where they have potential, e.g. tourism, and for improved access for ACP 
nationals to the EU labour market (Mode 4).  In an investment agreement they are seeking the 
provisions of investment facilities tailored to their particular needs and which ensures effective 
access to the provisions of the Investment Facility of Cotonou, which has so far proved 
problematic. 
Finally, fisheries offer one of the most important development potentials for the PACP. A 
fisheries agreement must offer benefits in excess of existing multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
agreements. Currently, under Cotonou, tuna exports from Fiji, the Solomon Islands and PNG 
enter the EU with a 24% preference, this will need to be safeguarded. Further the EU is seen as a 
potential market for intermediate quality frozen fish, but this will require trade facilitation 
assistance to meet food safety requirements. A number of issues remain unresolved in regard to 
the rules of origin for fish products – defined by territorial waters rather than EEZ. 
 
Sustainability Indicators 
The IDPM’s suggested a set of core and second tier sustainability indicators is presented in Table 
1. These are intended to be limited in number, but comprehensive in their coverage of the goals 
of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental.  The three target indicators 
are intended to indicate the final impact on sustainable development of any trade measure, 
supplemented by process indicators. The process indicators focus upon key procedures and 
practices which are needed to achieve long run sustainable development – i.e. they assess 
whether particular measures are consistent with sustainable development principles and whether 
they enhance institutional capacities.  
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The choice of indicators, especially the second tier, will depend upon data availability and the 
particular circumstances of countries being studied. In the case of the PACPs the economic 
assessment will need to recognise their shared economic characteristics and the impact an EPA 
might have upon their long-term performance. Thus indicators assessing the degree of economic 
diversification, rates of foreign investment, stock of skilled labour, trends in urban drift 
(migration from outer islands) and in emigration, will all be particularly relevant to the island 
economies of the Pacific.  In addition an EPA will have a particularly significant impact upon 
government revenues, given their high dependence upon import tariffs. An indicator of public 
revenue diversification might therefore also be relevant.  In terms of the social dimension of the 
SIAs it will be important to recognise the differing rural and urban experience in the PACPs; 
with rural sector measures of income per capita, education and health provision. Similarly for a 
number of the ACP states, such as Fiji, ethnic indicators of the incidence of poverty (e.g. income, 
employment) will be essential. Finally environmental indicators will need to include measures of 
water quality, pollution and sustainability of natural resources, especially tropical forests and 
fisheries. 
 The significance of changes in any indicator will depend upon the extent of existing 
social, economic or environmental stress, the direction of change, the magnitude of the change, 
the geographic extent of any impact, reversibility, and finally, the regulatory or institutional 
capacity to implement offsetting M & E measures.  
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Table 1 : Sustainability Indicators (Adapted from Table 4 IDPM (2002) 
Indicator  Core  Second Tier 
Economic Real Income 
Fixed Capital Formation 
Employment 
Savings, consumption 
Components 
Self/informal employment 
Social Poverty 
Health & education 
 
Equity 
Income 
Life expectancy, mortality rates, nutrition, literacy 
rates, enrolments. 
Income distribution by gender, ethnic group 
Environment Biodiversity 
Quality 
Natural resource stocks 
Eco-systems, endangered species 
Air, water, land 
Energy resources, non-renewable resources 
Process Consistency with 
Sustainable development 
Institutional capacity 
Polluter pays 
 
Sustainability mainstreamed, ‘ownership’ and 
political commitment 
 
The Second and Third Stages 
In the second and third stages of an SIA place greater emphasis upon the assessment of the 
separate components within each measure, as well as employing more rigorous analysis 
including quantitative modelling. Causal chain analysis will be used to trace the major causal 
links between each trade measure and establish their eventual sustainability impact. Second tier 
and process indicators will be considered and SIA’s applied to contrasting countries within the 
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broad country group being studied.  The EPA scenarios that might be considered in the PACP 
context include complete reciprocal free trade, exclusion of the five LDCs and US ‘compact’ 
countries from the EPA, groups of PACPs for whom particular sector agreements might be 
significant (e.g. fisheries, tourism), extension of the FTA to Australia and New Zealand, reform 
of the Sugar Protocol, with the phased removal of quotas but reduction in the EU internal price 
and the fall back scenario of the GSP. The introduction of mitigating and enhancement (M&E) 
measures will introduce a new range of possible scenarios. 
It is upon M&E measures that the stage three analysis focuses. M&Es can include 
agreements nesting within broader international trade agreements (e.g. WTO), trade-related 
measures that can form part of the EPA, measures to promote technical cooperation, capacity 
building, trade facilitation and the measures by national governments (i.e. structural reform, 
infrastructure investment, education and training, social policies).  
 EU support for the Convention for the Conservation Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western Central Pacific Ocean (‘Tuna Commission’) may be an important 
M&E measure for the fishing industry, especially as the EU has indicated that it wishes to be a 
full member.  It has already provided € 21 m. since 1975 under the Regional Indicative 
Programme to support the Forum Fisheries Agency, which supports PACP member’s 
participation in the Tuna Commission and the development of a sustainable industry. 
 Since the Cotonou Agreement specifically emphasises that it is aimed  “at enhancing the 
production, supply and trading capacity of ACP countries as well as their capacity to attract 
investment” (Article 34.3), trade facilitation measures should be a central issue. Trade 
facilitation will include technical assistance and funding to meet EU sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements and measures to assist in market development. Widely defined, these measures 
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would offer the potential to overcome many of the adverse consequences of adopting an EPA 
and therefore will be of considerable significance in any SIA. Although the EU has indicated that 
the overall level of financial assistance to the ACPs must be within the envelope provided under 
the European Development Funds of the Cotonou Agreement, this includes a substantial 
Investment Facility for private sector development, which offers considerable potential for 
funding trade facilitation measures. For example, should the PACPs chose to include services 
(especially tourism) or fisheries in the EPA negotiations then the potential for additional training 
support and market development, through the National (NIP) and Regional Indicative 
Programmes (RIP), and investment funding through the Investment Facility, will be crucial in an 
SIA. 
Similarly the level of EU aid will be important in offsetting the government revenue loss 
from the reduction in tariffs that would be required should the FTA be extended to Australia and 
New Zealand. Tonga, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu are all particularly vulnerable to reductions 
in tariff income. As long as the substantially all trade requirement is fulfilled some products will 
be able to retain tariffs. Samoa, the Cook Islands and PNG are already pursuing a programme of 
tariff reduction with substitution of VAT and excise duties, while FSM and Tonga are 
considering a major restructuring of their tax systems. Nonetheless taxation reform is likely to 
present one of the major challenges to the PACPs in adopting FTA’s with their major trading 
partners. In Fiji, for example, there is political opposition to tariff reductions and in the Marshall 
Islands to the introduction of consumption taxes. Meanwhile in Vanuatu there is opposition from 
elements in the financial services sector to the broadening of the tax base. The SIA will therefore 
need to make assumptions about the success of governments in achieving revenue substitution 
and the extent of EU transitional support.  Any reductions in government revenue would need to 
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be offset by reductions in public expenditure and this may be of considerable significance in 
estimating the social impact of adopting the EPA/PACER in the medium-term. 
Estimations of the economic and social impact will also be faced with the difficulty of 
anticipating the outcome of structural adjustment within particular sectors.  In the case of Fiji 
major restructuring of the sugar industry will be required if the industry is to be internationally 
competitive. Currently the refusal of the indigenous Fijians, who communally own the land, to 
renew the leases of the indo-Fijian tenant framers, is reducing production. Issues of land reform 
are thus as central as quality control and investment in securing the long-term future of the 
industry. Meanwhile the Fijian garment industry, which in 1999 employed 17,000 with exports 
of US$ 200 m., has guaranteed access to the Australian market under the South Pacific Regional 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTEC). However reductions in tariffs in 
Australia and New Zealand has undermined Fijis trade preference, exposing their garment 
exports to intensive Chinese competition. A lower effective ‘rules-of-origin’ has offered some 
protection, but this is likely to prove temporary. As both sectors employed particularly 
vulnerable groups, indo-Fijians in the case of sugar and women in the case of garment 
manufacture, employment reduction in these sectors may have a significant impact upon poverty.  
Thus the social ‘baseline scenario’ is particularly problematic in the case Fiji. 
The criteria for assessing M&E measures will include their cost-effectiveness, their 
feasibility in terms of the existing institutional capacity for their effective implementation and 
their contribution to achieving the sustainability objectives. Applying these criteria the SIA 
should identify a set of ‘best’ M&E measures whose impact upon the core economic, social 
environment indicators could then be assessed.  The sensitivity of the choice of the M&E 
measures can be assessed by substituting some of the ‘next best’ M&E options. However 
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assessment needs, appropriate assessment methods, and sufficient good quality data, will have to 
be reconciled with the resource constraints of the SIA. 
 We can therefore identify a number of crucial issues on which any Pacific SIA will have 
to focus. It will have to consider the impact of the extension of the EPA to Australia and New 
Zealand, the possible inclusion of services (especially tourism) and fisheries, the extent of trade 
facilitation measures, the enhancement of investment through the Investment Facility of Cotonou 
and the overall level of EU NIP and RIP aid. It will have to consider the wider context of EU-
ACP trade arrangements, in particular the possibility of a ‘two tier’ approach to EPA 
negotiations, with the establishment of uniform principles to be applied across all regional EPAs, 
and the future of the Sugar Protocol. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
We can now turn to the three central questions of this review. Firstly, the methodological 
approach of PWC; secondly, the influences upon the choices of alternative scenarios - i.e. who is 
setting the agenda, who has ‘ownership’; finally what influence, if any, has the SIA process upon 
the course of the EPA negotiations. 
 PCW (2003) explicitly acknowledge that they are following the IDPM methodology. 
They identify six broad areas that may be subject to negotiations under the EPAs – trade in 
goods/market access (e.g. import duties, quotas, safeguards, rules-of-origin, trade facilitation, 
agriculture, fisheries); investment; general trade-related areas (i.e. competition policy, 
intellectual property rights, standardisation, labour standards, consumer health, environment); 
specific trade-related areas (i.e. investment protection, public procurement) and legal issues 
(dispute settlement). In selecting the issues to be assessed they have adopted three criteria – core 
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components of Cotonou, areas subject to early negotiations and those identified, a priori, to have 
potential important sustainability impacts. Three broad regional groupings have initially been 
chosen based upon the Caribbean, Africa and Pacific.  In phase 1 in-depth regional SIA’s are 
being undertaken for West Africa and the Caribbean, as well as a preliminary overall ACP 
assessment. 
Indicators will be selected, on a case-by-case basis, from a broad list of economic, social 
and environmental measures. The social indicators include access to basic services, economic 
opportunities (drawing upon the Poverty Reduction Strategy agenda), social safety nets 
(including food security), migration, gender equality, HIV/AIDS and group vulnerability to 
economic and social shocks.  The environmental indicators (air and water quality, land and 
biodiversity) draw upon the approach of the OECD (2000). In addition to the usual economic 
indicators a particular emphasis is placed upon assessing the informal sector, in view of its 
significance in many ACP countries and its impact upon government revenues. Indicators are 
grouped under three headings. Firstly, ‘activity based indicators’ – means of production, 
activities and policies that may be affected by the EPAs (e.g. spending on schools). Secondly, 
‘results based indicators’ – assessing the impact of the EPA in the areas identified (e.g. school 
enrolment). Finally ‘impact indicators’ - the long-term global indicators to which result based 
indicators contribute, but which may be affected by other variables (e.g. literacy rates). 
Four ‘conditioning factors’ are identified as providing the context of the EPA 
negotiations. Firstly existing trade agreements, particularly the future of the EU’s Commodity 
Protocols and the WTO trade round.  Secondly, the economic context of the ACP states, both 
macro and micro, and including the impact of corruption. Thirdly, EU policies, particularly CAP 
reform. Finally, the situation of the least developed countries i.e. the EBA.  
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Again PWC follow the IDPM in their criteria for identifying M&E measures –  impact, 
cost-effectiveness and flexibility.  In addition they will be considering enforcement ability, 
transparency, equity, policy compatibility and political acceptability. M&E measures can both be 
trade related and general, and implemented over both the short and long-term. 
The criteria for the choice of alternative scenarios will be determined by the available 
data and modelling techniques, issues that are “inspired by the context of the negotiations”, and 
issues which may have an impact upon the broader development objectives of the EU-ACP 
partnership. Five possible scenarios are suggested for economic modelling at the ACP level – the 
phasing out of the Commodity Protocols, zero tariffs, EU enlargement, CAP reform and possibly 
the impact of the WTO trade round. “It should be noted that the scenarios have not been chosen 
for their likelihood nor because the consortium considered them as options for the negotiations” 
however…“these details scenarios will be discussed with Commission and might also be made 
available for stakeholder input”. The lack of disaggregated data is likely to prevent such 
economic modelling at the regional level. 
In their final Phase One report (2004) PWC indicate the focus that has emerged from 
their first regional studies of West Africa and the Caribbean. Of the economic sectors agriculture 
emerges as of particular importance given its dominance in many ACPs (e.g. 85% of the 
population are employed in subsistence agriculture in PNG and 66% in Tonga). It is a sector that 
presents major potential environmental problems and is important in its social impact through the 
predominance of small scale framers.  The opportunities for diversification will be a crucial 
aspect to evaluate in any SIA. 
 In considering trade influenced economic changes PWC identify, amongst others, 
impacts upon traditional commodities that employ large numbers of the population (e.g. sugar), 
 21
changes that increase migration (i.e. outer island depopulation), activities that occur near 
coastlines (e.g. infrastructure development) and impacts upon food security (e.g. decling fish 
stocks) – all of which are of particular relevance to the PACP situation. 
 They also emphasised the potential for regional integration; this may involve 
consideration of the sub-groupings for any SIA as already discussed. Secondly, the opportunities 
for horizontal diversification; the potential to reduce dependence upon a particular economic 
activity is a central issue in assessing the impact of trade changes that may challenge such 
traditional activities. Thus the social and economic impact of the phasing out of the Sugar 
Protocol will depend not only upon the ability of the industry to restructure to become more 
competitive, but also upon the alternative employment opportunities or social support available 
to the displaced sugar farmers. Similarly the environmental impact will depend upon the harms 
and benefits from the traditional activities compared with those offered by the new. 
In the case of the PACPS the development of the fishing and tourism industries must be a 
particular focus for assessing environmental impact. At the same time the constraints upon 
diversification (e.g. transport infrastructure, marketing, research and development) will need to 
be considered. Similarly, the potential for vertical integration (e.g. fish processing). This may be 
encouraged by asymmetrical and ‘back-loaded’ tariff reductions in the EPA, providing medium 
term ‘infant industry’ support. 
 PWC also consider the importance of investment (primarily through public-private- 
partnerships for infrastructure); the need to address technical standards as an obstacle to trade 
through technical assistance and Mutual Recognition Agreements and the liberalisation of 
services, including issues of technology/management transfer.  
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NGO Critique 
Turning to the issues of the ‘ownership’ and influence of the SIAs, although the NGOs 
welcomed the principle of the adoption of SIA by the EU they have become increasingly critical 
of its employment in practice (NGO 2003). They have found very little evidence of it influencing 
trade negotiations at the WTO nor in the formulation of mitigating and enhancement policies. In 
particular they have criticised the assumption that increased trade liberalisation must be desirable 
and welfare enhancing. They argue that the “no liberalisation of trade in different forms” 
scenarios is excluded from SIA assessments3 “closing off alternative policy options and 
undermining the purpose of the tool”.  The existing trade regime provides the baseline case for 
most SIA studies, thus only a scenario of increased trade restrictions are likely to be excluded 
from the assessment.  
More tellingly they observe that it is the Commission that has determined the alternative 
scenarios to be evaluated and that these usually reflect its predetermined focus. The response that 
other interested parties may undertake their own analysis is dismissed, as other stakeholders will 
not have the resources available, nor are such studies likely to be as influential with the 
Commission if it does not have ‘ownership’.  This does raise the central issue of the purpose of 
EU funded SIAs – are these technical studies to support the Commission’s negotiating process, 
objective assessments to be employed by all parties to the negotiations or public relations 
exercises to support the EC’s position in a wider stake-holder environment? Since the NGOs also 
see little evidence of the SIAs so far undertaken actually influencing the process of policy 
formulation, including at the Member State level, current evidence might suggest the latter. 
                                                 
3
 “through an EPA the parties might seek … to pursue trade liberalisation and enhance the competitiveness of their 
firms in global markets… (PWC 2005b p. 5) 
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The NGOs also criticise the emphasise upon adjustment on the part of the LDC trading 
partners without addressing the need for change in the EU’s  “damaging trade distorting 
policies”. In EU terms this represents a call for ‘coherence’ in EU policies but it fails to give 
sufficient acknowledgement to the continuing pressure for CAP reform, both from a number of 
EU Member States and as part of the current WTO trade round. Indeed this has become a central 
issue in stalling the round. 
Finally they emphasise the importance of ensuring that mitigating and enhancement 
measures are delivered. In the context of the ACP EPAs there is a significant advantage in that 
the Cotonou aid mechanism clearly provides such a potential mechanism, although the existence 
of the institutional framework alone is no guarantee it will be employed.  
 
Assessment 
PWC are clearly following the “Manchester” SIA framework and many of the issues they have 
isolated from their ACP and regional studies correctly identify aspects relevant to the PACPs. 
The existing social impact assessments being undertaken as part of PICTA, and the economic 
assessments already commissioned by the PIF, such as that by Scollay, provide a basis upon 
which a more comprehensive SIA could have been constructed. 
 However some fundamental questions remain unanswered. Firstly, how are the alternate 
scenarios to be selected? The existing Lomè trade agreement provides the ‘base scenario’, 
although this cannot continue beyond 2008. The ‘notional agreement scenarios’ – the most likely 
outcomes of the negotiations – are much more problematic. Although a reciprocal WTO- 
compatible EPA is the most probable, it will be complicated by the M&E measures and the 
possibility of a master/subsidiary agreement. Further complications arise from the lack of clarity 
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at the ACP level. In particular how far is a ‘two-tier’ EPA structure likely to emerge i.e. an ACP-
wide agreement on broad principles, establishing consistency, within which regional EPAs will 
be constructed? The employment of a centralised Brussels team for the negotiations will enhance 
the EC’s ability to pursue such a strategy if it so chooses. Alternatively will each region be 
allowed substantial flexibility to develop an EPA responsive to it own particular circumstances 
and needs? In the case of the PACPs this is being expressed most forcefully in the proposal, 
advocated by the PIF, for a master/subsidiary ‘pick and mix’ EPA.  
 The Joint Road Map (EC 2004) gives some indication of the EC’s thinking. It emphasises 
the sustainable development objective of the EPA and the flexibility which it can embody. It 
specifically recognises the need for special and differential treatment for all PACPs to take 
account of their differing needs and levels of development. Such differential treatment is not 
“limited only to longer transitional periods and technical assistance (para.14)” and “may go 
beyond existing WTO measures”. “Flexibility will be built into the broadly agreed framework to 
allow individual countries to adjust the pattern and schedules of implementation”. The PIF 
proposal for a master/subsidiary structure of an EPA thus appears to be accepted in principle. 
 However it reaffirms the requirement that the “Pacific ACP-EU EPA be compatible with 
WTO rules then prevailing (para. 18).” But it also commits the EU to working with the PACPs 
to identify and further their common interests in the ongoing Doha Round negotiations, which 
may change these WTO requirements, particularly in regard to the issues of the definition of 
‘substantially all trade’ and ‘special and differential treatment’ for the developing countries. 
While answers to these questions would provide a clearer focus for the SIA, there is the 
further substantial complication of the triggering of PACER. The implications of the EPA for 
this trade agreement, and that of the US ‘compact states’, is specifically acknowledged in the 
 25
Joint Road Map and ‘will need to be reflected in all areas of negotiations” (par. 17). Thus an SIA 
that fails to consider the implications of the extension of a matching FTA to Australia and New 
Zealand would be fundamentally flawed. 
Finally there remains the question of the ‘ownership’ of the SIA. PWC acknowledge that 
the purpose of an SIA is to “increase transparency by developing a basis for discussion with 
European and ACP stakeholders about sustainability implications associated with the 
negotiations”. For the EC (2004) “particular attention will be paid to the ongoing EC SIA 
exercise with a view to both making optimal use of its results within the EPA negotiations and 
feeding ideas and outcomes of the negotiation process into the construction of a Pacific ACP-
specific SIA exercise” (para. 33). 
George and Kirkpatrick (2003) identified a number of potential challenges in undertaking 
such an SIA. Problems can arise in the consultative process including in identifying appropriate 
stakeholders, breadth of consultation versus depth and the limited capacity of civil society 
organisations. There is also the problem of adequate data and robust theoretical models. Models 
are limited in applicability to the trade in services, in identifying the causal relationship between 
economic, social and environmental impacts and in identifying the adjustment process to a new 
equilibrium.  Although existing case studies can be an important source for any SIA, case studies 
are likely to be few. In the case of the PACPs social impact assessments have already been 
undertaken under PICTA (Forsyth & Plange 2001) but their approach has been subject to 
criticism (Kelsey 2004). The impact of any trade agreement will also be dynamic and long term, 
and this further increases the uncertainties inherent in any SIA, reducing their credibility and 
influence upon negotiators. Post-agreement monitoring of actual impacts and flexibility in the 
M&E response are the suggested methods of dealing with this problem. 
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However it must also be recognised that the impact of any trade measure upon a country 
is heavily dependent upon the national policy response. “Securing the potential gains from 
multilateral trade liberalisation requires well-developed markets, effective regulatory institutions 
and a stable and predictable policy framework. Where these necessary conditions are absent or 
weak, trade liberalisation is unlikely to be a sufficient condition for achieving sustainable 
development “ (George and Kirkpatrick (2003) Page 22). Thus ensuring the effective application 
of M&E measures will depend as much upon the national policy response as upon the measures 
themselves. 
PWC’s Phase II Inception (2004b) and Mid-Term (2005b) Reports address some of these 
issues. They identified the major problem presented in ensuring informed involvement of the 
wider ‘stakeholder community’ in the EPA negotiations. Their lack of information about both the 
EPA and SIA process4 has led PWC to recommend the establishment of a ‘High Level 
Independent Advisory Committee’ and of a permanent ‘EU-ACP Cooperative Dialogue for 
Public Participation and Capacity Building for Sustainability’. (PWC 2005b ps. 6-7) The latter 
would provide the post-agreement monitoring that the IDPM recommends and offer a focus for 
discussions about the impact of trade upon sustainable development. PWC’s reports also 
emphasise the broader national framework necessary to realise the potential benefits of any EPA 
– employment creation, poverty reduction, a stable commercial framework, strengthening 
environmental protection and trade liberalisation (PWC 2005b pgs. 5, 31).  
However for the PACP PWC decided to undertake an SIA confined to the fishing 
industry for the region. Although reiterating the scenario selection criteria – trade significance 
and a priori sustainability impact – the reason for the choice of fisheries for the Pacific SIA 
                                                 
4
 Confirmed by the authors own interviews in Fiji and the Cook Islands in August 2004. 
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remains unclear. It does not appear to be a product of significant consultation in the Pacific 
region as this was undertaken during Phase II of the SIA. The fishery industry certainly offers 
the most significant potential benefits from a regional approach. Encouraging regional 
integration is a prime objective of EC development policy and central to the EC’s approach to 
the EPA negotiations5. But it might also reflect the importance of sustainability issues in an 
industry where many tuna species are already fully or over-exploited. The EC has already 
encouraged sustainable management of the industry through its long-term financial support for 
the Forum Fisheries Agency under the PACP Regional Indicative Programme. However, 
although PWC states that the EU “is a minor player in tuna fishing in the West Central Pacific 
Ocean and is likely to remain one” (PWC 2005b page 27) they also acknowledge that the decline 
in the potential for fishing in EU waters means that EU vessels will have to look much further 
afield and that this may extend to the Pacific. Thus the selection of this sector for an SIA may 
reflect the EU’s own interest in the potential development of this industry, including access for 
EU fleets.  
 The sector study recognises that fish exports to the EU are likely to be limited to niche 
markets for prepared products, but that these offer the maximum potential for local value added.  
Any regional Fisheries Partnership Agreement would need to ensure continued duty and quota 
free access to the EU market while encouraging local industry capacity building. It will also need 
to safeguard the existing financial interests of the three PACP’s with established EU bilateral 
agreements6. To facilitate the local development of the industry the SIA recommends the 
application of compulsory local landing requirements, the accelerated reduction in tariffs on 
                                                 
5
 Regional integration was one of the three categories of PWC’s SIA’s policy recommendations, together with trade 
measures and sustainability. 
6
 Kiribati, Solomon Islands, FSM 
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capital goods imports and the creation of a stable investment environment by the PACP’s. 
Government policy would also need to prioritise transport infrastructure, subject to 
environmental impact sensitivities.  Trade facilitation measures will need to address the EU’s 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) requirements, labelling and packaging requirements, and they 
argue that this is best achieved through the development of regional standards enforced by 
regional bodies.  For the EU PWC recommends the payment by vessel owners of a lump sum for 
access to the PACP’s EEZs directly to a regional body, to fund regional initiatives for the 
development of sustainable fisheries. 
 
Conclusion 
Although individual sector assessments7 will inform the SIA methodology it is difficult to see 
how these studies alone will provide the basis for the wider regional SIAs or meet the EC’s own 
declared expectations for the Pacific SIA. Even a specific regional sectoral SIA may be of 
limited relevance to other ACP regions e.g. the tourism study for the Caribbean to the PACP. At 
the most recent PACP national level workshop in March and April 2005 discussions extended 
beyond a potential Multilateral Fisheries Partnership Agreement to encompass investment 
promotion and tourism agreements, while the PACP has commissioned studies of the potential 
for a commodity price stabilisation mechanism and migrant access to EU labour markets. Clearly 
the PACP’s agenda in the EPA negotiations is considerably wider than that of fisheries. 
 The Pacific SIA also remains particularly weak in its discussion of the impact of the 
opening up of the PACP markets to EU exports under the required ‘reciprocity’ principle, other 
than a reference to the preservation of tariffs to protect ‘sensitive products’ such as processed 
                                                 
7
 SIAs were also undertaken into Caribbean tourism and the agro-industry in West Africa. 
 29
fish (PWC 2005b page 29). Although this may be of little significance given the limited extent of 
EU exports to the PACP’s, the extension of any tariff concessions to Australia and New Zealand 
under PACER, their major trading partners, will have a far more dramatic impact. It is already 
clear that both Australia and New Zealand regard the commencement of EPA negotiations as 
having triggered PACER renegotiations (Kelsey 2004). While the medium-term SIA report 
(PWC 2005a page 116) acknowledges the importance of this issue, the final Phase II report fails 
to address it (PWC 2005b). 
 At the same time the PWC SIA is unrelated to the emerging call for the benchmarking of 
the overall EPA negotiations.  With the primacy given to the potential contribution of the EPAs 
to sustainable development it has been proposed that there is a need for the development of 
systematic criteria to assess progress in the negotiations (ICTSD and APRODEV 2005). Under 
the Cotonou Agreement there is a requirement to undertake a comprehensive review of the state 
of EPA negotiations in 2006. If the EU’s Member States, European Parliament and Commission 
are to effectively undertake this review then there is an urgent need for the creation of such a 
framework. 
 But above all this review raises the question of the ‘ownership’ of the SIA process and 
whether the SIA will be usefully employed, either by the Commission or the PACPs, in the 
current negotiations.  
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